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INTRODUCTION 
In an article published in this journal, C.O. Akpan argues that it is “unnatural for a man to sleep with a 
man as with a woman, and the idea of marriage in this sense is an abomination” (2017, p. 9). Arguments 
in favour of same sex marriage, he claims, are “driven and motivated by the human right fad through 
which same-sex couples feel they have [an] ‘inalienable right’ over their bodies and regarding who to 
marry…” (Akpan, 2017, p. 9). However, this alleged right is a “misrepresentation of what was originally 
intended,” and is therefore “a sort of elixir forced on people to accept same-sex marriage as a 
fundamental right. This is a consequent of [Western] culture’s anomie and cannot be made a global 
phenomenon” (Akpan, 2017, p. 9). In particular, he thinks that same-sex marriage (and homosexuality) is 
(are) inappropriate for African countries such as Nigeria where he lives and works. 
Africans have a legitimate concern about any imposition of ‘Western values’ on Africa. As Marc 
Epprecht (2013; 2008) has noted, the colonialism of Europe and the Americas has had some 
tremendously negative effects on Africa, including the western world’s cultural and moral imperialism. It 
is important, therefore, to include African voices in a discussion of homosexuality and same-sex marriage 
in our discussion, which we do here. Having said that, however, flawed arguments remain flawed 
regardless of their author, and, we argue, Akpan’s arguments are deeply flawed. To begin, he 
misrepresents both ‘Western’ and ‘African’ views as homogeneous and ‘real African’ positions as 
somehow removed from any outside influences, whether that be from the West, the Middle East or 
elsewhere. ‘Western’ and ‘African’ thought is heterogeneous and fluid on a few issues including 
homosexuality and same-sex marriage. Hence, we begin our argument in Section 2 by setting the context 
with a brief discussion of Africa (including its diversity), both historically and at present. Another function 
of this section is to demonstrate that human rights are neither a “fad” nor something about which only 
‘Westerners’ are interested.  
Despite Akpan’s view on the immorality of homosexuality, his arguments in opposition to them 
clearly emanate from the Abrahamic religious tradition, which is an import to Africa. Moreover, though 
he formally rejects two widely employed anti-LGBTQ+ arguments as flawed -- the so-called 
unnaturalness argument and the argument from religion – his acceptance of the complementarity 
argument is a close relation, and in fact is based upon both these positions. Thus, as we shall see in detail 
in Section 3, Akpan’s anti- LGBTQ+ and anti same-sex marriage position is inadequately defended and 
should be rejected.  
In Section 3, we also consider Akpan’s claims that the ‘West’ suffers from a cultural anomie that 
they attempt to force upon the rest of the world. Here, we show the ways in which Akpan misrepresents 
Western culture and the place of human rights within it, as well as the meaning of “anomie.” It is not that 
the West suffers from a lack of cultural norms, which is what is typically meant by anomie. Far from it: 
the nations of the West have cultural and moral norms, but these nations are heterogeneous, not 
homogeneous. One need only consider the social, political, and moral divide between two opposing 
camps within contemporary America to see the truth of this claim. To protect itself against the chaos 
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that such divisions can cause within a nation state, we must allow many groups of people (and individuals) 
to follow different paths to achieve what they perceive as the good for them as well as a conception of 
the public good. Hence, liberal democracies that respect both majorities, via public voting, and 
minorities, via constitutions and charters of rights and freedoms, aim to allow different groups within a 
nation state to co-exist peacefully.1 They do this in large part by allowing their citizens, either individually 
or in combination, freedom in many areas, such as religion, expression, and association. These freedoms 
are allowed so long as doing so does not “harm” others, in the requisite sense of that term. Concomitant 
with these freedoms are rights that prohibit discrimination based on such things as race, sex, and religion.  
Finally, in Section 4 we turn to consider the situation in South Africa, the only African nation to 
enshrine LGBTQ+ rights within its constitution. This consideration is fundamentally important. Though 
we believe we have shown the weaknesses of Akpan’s (and others’) anti-LGBTQ+ arguments, the real 
test of LGBTQ+ recognition comes from the ground, so to speak, i.e., how has this recognition altered 
the everyday situation of real people living real lives. By starting with a decision to leave behind the moral 
arguments on LGBTQ+, South Africa decided upon a political and legal course of action.  In this section, 
we show the benefits, in terms of health especially, of a legal recognition of LGBTQ+ rights concomitant 
with a political obligation to adhere to such rights.  
THE AFRICAN CONTEXT 
In providing a proper context for discussing sexual rights in Africa, we define sexual rights as part of the 
broader definition of human rights, and we also show how the history of human rights in Africa is part of 
the overall global history of human rights. One of the problems with Akpan’s discussion of rights is he 
does neither of these things, opting instead to (erroneously) dismiss rights as a Western “fad.”  
Sexual rights are most appropriately considered as human rights in general. While there is no 
consensus on the precise definition of sexual rights, the working definition of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) states, "Sexual rights embrace certain human rights that are already recognized in 
international and regional human rights treaties, supported in consensus documents and found in 
national laws” (WHO, 2010). It then outlines fundamental rights that are essential to the full realization 
of sexual health. Sexual rights, then, are based on applying existing fundamental human rights to sexual 
health and sexuality in the context of protection against discrimination. The specific rights include the 
rights to life, liberty, autonomy and security of the person, the right to be free from torture or cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to privacy and the rights to information and 
education. Others include the rights to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to an effective 
remedy for violations of their fundamental rights. To assert, as Akpan does, that rights are a foreign, 
Western infiltration into Africa, indirectly also asserts that all the rights referred to in this paragraph are 
alien to Africa. This seems implausible. 
The context in which Akpan's paper is set is the historical evolution of human rights in general in 
a highly diverse and changing Africa. Without subscribing to the "radical break" theory, which asserts 
there were human rights protections in pre-colonial African communities, or to claims that there is a ‘hard 
split’ between the colonial and post-colonial periods, for heuristic purposes we consider three phases of 
underlying conditions relevant to people’s rights. These are the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial 
phases of African human rights developments. 
 
 
                                                          
1 The reason the US appears on the brink of chaos at the moment is a complex issue beyond the scope of this paper. One could 
argue, however, that a disrespect for the rule of law (like the appropriate separation between various branches of 
government), a failure to respect the point of views of others, the failure to protect minorities, and a turn to demagoguery are 
all part of America’s current problems. Interestingly, this is a problem that we have seen in far too many nations within Africa 
as we discuss below. 
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Pre-Colonial Phase 
In the pre-colonial phase, Africa was dominated by traditional societies organized around more than 
3,000 ethnic groups, featuring equally diverse languages and cultures. This background highlights the 
historic nature of the massive heterogeneity that makes it difficult to avoid Africa's astonishing diversity 
by trying to tell a single story, good intentions for an emancipatory Pan Africa notwithstanding. It also 
defies efforts to put a simple label to ideas as being 'un-African', as we have indicated regarding human 
rights. 
In discussions of African human rights regimes of these earliest periods, one contentious issue 
has been whether there were human rights protections or merely a defense of human dignity in 
traditional societies. One idea regarding the beginning of human rights is that it began in ancient Europe: 
in, for example, the ancient philosophy, religion, and mythology of Greece. Another view similarly thinks 
the origin of human rights is European (and North American) but temporally places that beginning in the 
modern period, culminating in the UN human rights declaration of 1948. 
If we accept that human rights originally stem from Europe, the claim by some scholars  who 
uncover “African” forms of rights in the pre-colonial past confuse human dignity for human rights (Tibi, 
1990) (Howard, 1990). While they acknowledge that fully developed notions of human dignity existed in 
societies outside Western cultures and contexts, the notion of human rights as enforceable against the 
state only came from the later articulation of entitlements in law. They argue that protections of human 
dignity alone do not generate human rights. Rhoda Howard, for instance, claims that the focus in 
traditional Africa was only on the inner moral nature and worth of the human person: "There is no 
specifically African concept of human rights. The argument for such a concept is based on a philosophical 
confusion of human dignity with human rights, and on an inadequate understanding of structural 
organization and social change in African society" (Howard, 1990, p. 23). 
Other writers arrive at the same conclusion by using the distinction between human rights and 
distributive justice (Connelly, 1982). The central argument in this case is that giving people their 
entitlements as rights is different from having rights that accrue from the fact that one is a human being. 
In this view, rights assigned in traditional African societies according to one's communal membership, 
recognized achievements, family position or status do not qualify as human rights. 
However, if we recognize and appreciate competing narratives about the meaning, practice, and 
history of human rights around the world including Africa itself, it makes sense to avoid the fixity of a 
single calcified meaning of human rights, as a recent legal 'gift' from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948. Obviously, essentialist legal scholars and legal positivists will disagree but the risk of being 
a-historical cannot be ignored. Downplaying the historical context partly accounts for this focus on 
change while neglecting the vital underlying continuities that provide the progression towards a more 
inclusive human right. As Ugor puts it: 
Human Rights may have been codified and legally backed in 1948, but the philosophy and 
practices that it implies are traceable to different societies across the world and Africa ... 
At the very core of the idea of human rights is the concern with how individuals and groups 
interact within society. This implies that the most fundamental unit of social life is neither 
solely the individual nor the group, but rather the association between the two (Ugor, 
2018, p. 368). 
In this regard, the following remarks by Wole Soyinka, commenting on the practice in Northern Nigeria 
of stoning women to death, are important: 
We can anticipate that some will claim that the religious laws under which such barbarity 
is justified predate the laws of the entity called Nigeria - and do note that I pronounce it a 
barbarity on the authority, not of the Western or Christian world, but on that of pre-
existent codes of social regulations evolved in several of those constituent nations, the 
Yoruba among them, whose adjudicating systems, the balance of ethical norms, 
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infringement and restitution boast a longer ancestry than those of either of the imported 
religions of this nation - Christianity and Islam” (Soyinka, 2008, p. 47). 
The other contextual backdrop to the evolution of human rights in Africa is the experience of 
widespread slavery. For four hundred years Africans were on the run from the monstrosity and raw terror 
of slave raids. As some have pointed out, what is stunning is that we even have a culture to speak of after 
such a harrowing historic episode. Apart from the immediate destruction that transpired, we will return 
to long-term consequences of slavery in discussing human rights in the post-colonial period. 
The anti-slavery and emancipation struggles were part of the slow but sure progress towards 
fundamental freedoms and human rights. These struggles are relevant in thinking about human rights 
and inspiring in the quest for a more inclusive human rights regime in Africa today. 
 
The Colonial Period 
The historical link between the independence struggles in Africa and human rights is sometimes 
dismissed because anti-colonialism movements sought popular liberation and were not focused on 
limiting state power. However, as Bonny Ibhawoh has argued, 
anti-colonialism did not develop in isolation of the universal human rights discourse. It was 
integral to the development and vernacularization of the post-war universal human rights 
ideal. By vernacularization, I mean the complex process by which external impulses were 
appropriated into local ideas and situations to produce hybridized understandings of human 
rights (Ibhawoh, 2014).  
Generally, African states and their perspectives on decolonization and anti-colonialism were important 
to the history and emergence of the United Nations and its human rights agenda/legislation. The 
relationship between human rights and anti-colonialism though was not unidirectional. During the 
debates, the so-called colonial powers put up unprincipled defenses of colonization, pretending that lack 
of self determination had nothing to do with universal fundamental human rights. 
 
The Post- Colonial Period 
Post-colonial Africa is made up of 54 countries on the continent as well as six island states. Sometimes, 
a distinction is drawn between northern Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, which excludes Morocco, Algeria, 
Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. The total population of the continent is just over 1.2 billion. There are six 
different colonial legacies including British, French, Portuguese and German and more than 12 
agroecological zones (Todd J Moss, 2018) .  
At the beginning of 1990, out of the 54 African countries, 49 were dictatorships of the military or 
‘civilian’ type. The citizens had practically no substantive role in determining public policy because of low 
levels of political competition and participation. Leadership turnover was rare. Between the 
independence years in early 1950s and 1990, no African government had changed leadership by way of 
peaceful electoral defeat, the majority having been ejected by uniformed gunmen. The exceptions were 
Ahijdo of Cameroon, Senghor of Senegal, and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. During the 2000s, almost all 
states carried out both economic and political reforms. The results are mixed. Some countries did 
relatively well. These include South Africa, Rwanda, Kenya, Botswana, Ghana, Cote d Ivoire, Benin, 
Ethiopia, and Senegal. Others fell behind including Malawi, Eritrea, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Central 
African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, and Togo. Zimbabwe stands on its own with an imploded economy 
and a military government. 
As a region, the profile of human rights in Africa has evolved and made the following 
achievements: 
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1. African states (especially frontline states as we used to call them) actively supported South Africa 
in removing the apartheid system. Here it must be emphasized that the struggle in South Africa 
was against minority rule, not against a section of South African society. 
2. The rise of the public profile of human rights since the adoption of the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights in 1981, subsequently ratified by the African Union. 
3. The incorporation by some African states of human rights provisions or bills of rights in their 
constitutions. 
4. The establishment by some African states of national institutions and mechanisms; for example, 
national human rights commissions, including Uganda, to promote and protect human rights. 
5. An expansion of the normative and institutional architecture of the regional human rights 
system.  
6. The signing of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child. 
7. The establishment of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the African 
Child. 
8. The adoption by the African Union in 2003 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights of Women in Africa. 
9. The African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. 
10. More involvement and contributions to human rights work by individuals, including scholars, 
lawyers, and advocates. 
All these accomplishments indicate that, contrary to what Akpan maintains, there has been a great 
interest in pushing for human rights within Africa by Africans.  
 Having said that, it is also undeniable that the continent has experienced some setbacks or 
limitations. The regional human rights achievements mentioned above have tended to be exclusionary 
to certain groups, especially the LGBTQ+ community. The only African nation to include LGBTQ+ rights 
is South Africa, which we discuss in some detail in Section 4. The problem with the other African states 
is that they have yet to bring the internationally recognized rights of non-discrimination to LGBTQ+ 
citizens of their countries. This remains the case even when most of those states specify non-
discrimination in their constitutions. 
The second setback is the criminalizing of homosexuality. There has been a wave in opposition 
to bringing sexual rights under the umbrella of human rights more generally, and of repealing laws or at 
least lessening the severity of ‘sexual crimes. For example, in 1990, Uganda extended punishment for 
‘carnal knowledge against the order of nature’ from a 14-year jail term to life imprisonment. In 2005, a 
constitutional amendment was passed prohibiting same-sex marriages. This sort of re-criminalization 
was repeated in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Rwanda, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, 
Malawi, Kenya, Tanzania, and the Gambia. Among these, only Rwanda dropped plans to criminalize 
same sex relations. This stands in stark contrast to the 1990s where there were no arrests related to same 
sex relations in most African states and homosexuality was mostly not on anyone’s political agenda. 
Lastly, while instruments are now available de jure, the protection of human rights faces a 
multiplicity of challenges, led by the administrative capacity issues of the states. e.g., turmoil in Northern 
Uganda and Northern Nigeria. 
Sadly, a major factor in the repeated pattern of making gains followed by setbacks is related to 
the slave history of Africa. Evidence of a causal link from slave raids to mistrust in modern day Africa is 
documented by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). They show that current differences in trust levels within 
Africa can be traced back to the transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades. They combined 
contemporary individual-level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group and 
found that individuals whose ancestors were heavily raided during the slave trade are less trusting today. 
They show that most of the impact of the slave trade is through factors that are internal to the individual, 
such as cultural norms, beliefs, and values. Here it is mistrust for family members, relatives, other 
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individuals, clients, and governments at any level. This is an important factor in the real lived contexts of 
Africa for any reform and development effort in the post-colonial period. A key ingredient in reforms and 
development is cooperation. This is so critical that it is advanced as one of the reasons for the dominance 
of the humans as a species. It is far more difficult to get cooperation where there is underlying mistrust. 
One way forward, even within this context of mistrust, may come from viewing human, and thus 
sexual minority rights, in a holistic manner. Zeleza (Zeleza & McConnaughay, 2004) argues that the 
construction of human rights norms is a dynamic and continuous process which is foreclosed neither by 
exclusivist claims of an envisaged western progeny and universality nor an equally make-believe African 
or Asian cultural singularity and relativity. The plea for a holistic view of human rights is captured well in 
his introduction: 
Thus, neither the North nor the South, the developed nor the developing worlds can claim 
to be on the side of angels where human rights are concerned. Yet, ethnocentrism continues 
in human rights discourse about conceptualization, constitution, and contextualization of 
human rights. A more holistic global regime of human rights would have to encompass all 
the so-called three generation of [rights]. The growing list of rights [is] itself a reflection of 
the emergence of an increasingly universal human rights regime as more and more societies 
and social constituencies, hitherto excluded from human rights claims, make their demands 
for inclusion. 
Having set the context of rights in Africa, let us turn to the specific argument made by Akpan against 
same sex marriage and homosexuality. 
AKPAN’S ARGUMENT 
We note first that though Akpan claims his argument focuses on the moral illegitimacy of same-sex 
marriage, his arguments against same-sex marriage2 depend on and are often conflated with his claim 
that homosexuality is immoral. This dependence comes out clearly when he says that “’[s]ame-sex 
marriage’ evokes questions pertaining to sexual morality” (Akpan, 2017, p. 4).  
In considering the morality of homosexuality, Akpan considers but rejects (he claims) two 
arguments often used by those who are anti-LGBTQ+: the unnaturalness argument and the argument 
from religion. Yet, his support of the anti LGBTQ+ ‘complementarity’ argument relies upon these two 
arguments. So, a very brief discussion of these two ‘rejected’ arguments is in order. 
The religious argument against homosexuality notes that in sacred scripture in all three 
Abrahamic religions -- Judaism, Christianity, and Islam --, homosexuality is considered immoral. In 
Judaism and Christianity, the most often cited scripture is Leviticus 18:22 “you must not have intercourse 
with man as you would with woman; it is abomination.” Muslims often refer to the story of the prophet 
Lot telling his people: “Will you commit lewdness such as no people in creation have committed before 
you? For you come in lust to men in preference to women. No, you are indeed a people transgressing 
beyond bounds (Qur’an:7:80-81). As Akpan points out, these arguments must be rejected because very 
few Christians, Jews, and Muslims interpret sacred scripture so literally, or follow all the laws as they are 
stipulated therein. (Akpan, 2017, pp. 5-6). So, not following strict rules against homosexuality may be no 
                                                          
2 Akpan actually distinguishes between two forms of same-sex marriage. One of these forms occurs when the marriage 
partners of the same sex engage in sex together, or are at least intimate in some sexual way. This is the type of same sex 
marriage familiar not only in the West but around the world. It is also the form of same sex marriage that we will discuss in this 
paper. The other form of same-sex marriage Akpan discusses is practiced in parts of Africa where a married woman marries 
another woman. Here, though, the two women do not have sex together. Rather, they get married because, allegedly, the 
initial wife can’t conceive or can’t bear children. The second wife is brought into the marriage to allow for procreation by 
having sex with the husband. For all intents and purposes, this second type of marriage is really a form of heterosexual 
polygyny. Akpan rejects this form of same-sex marriage as well – on the basis that it is a form of adultery. Since this practice 
has nothing to do with same-sex marriage as it is commonly conceived, we do not discuss it further. 
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odder than not following Biblical injunctions against eating sheep’s fat (Leviticus 7:23) or the requirement 
that we condemn to death children who curse their parents (Leviticus 20:9: Akpan, pp. 5-6).   
The unnaturalness argument moves from the claims that homosexuality in unnatural and that all 
unnatural things or behaviours are immoral to the conclusion that homosexuality must be immoral. The 
problem here, which is well documented in the literature (e.g., Leiser, 1997), is that there is no way to 
define unnatural consistently, and without equivocation, that makes the statements that ‘homosexuality 
is unnatural’ and that ‘all unnatural things/acts/behaviour are immoral’ both true. Consider, for example, 
when we define unnatural as uncommon (or statistically abnormal). Here, it becomes clear that though 
homosexuality is statistically uncommon, it is also quite clear that not all uncommon things are immoral, 
e.g., being 7 ft. tall, being a university professor, having red hair, etc. The most used definition of 
unnatural for use in this argument is dysteleological, i.e., something used in a way that is inconsistent 
with its purpose.  Akpan rejects this form of the argument by noting it is too broad since it would make 
immoral several things that we typically don’t consider so, such as sexual intercourse while using 
“artificial” forms of birth control, or sex between infertile people, such as women who have passed 
menopause, or men whose sperm is impotent (Akpan, 2017, p. 5). 
But there are other problems with this argument that should be noted because Akpan uses them 
in his defence of the complementarity argument.  Teleology has historically connoted a God created 
universe where everything (and their parts) has a designed purpose. This view is popular within religion 
but has been rejected by science since the Renaissance when scientists like Galileo worked to separate 
scientific investigation from religious ones. Darwin’s theory of evolution by means of natural selection is 
particularly clear on this point. Speciation is not the result of purpose/telos designed by an omnipotent 
being, but by purely mechanical, earthly forces. Evolution is simply far too ‘messy’ to be the product of 
omnipotent design, a fact brought out by the fact that approximately 99% of the species that have ever 
existed on our planet are now extinct (See, e.g., Fuller, 2014). As we shall see below when we discuss the 
complementarity argument, organisms and their parts have functions, but not teloi. The difference 
between the two is important. Function does not imply creation (other than biological reproduction), and 
especially not designed creation. Moreover, function has no implication for morality. That is, there is no 
connotation that using a thing in a non-functional way is immoral, even if using a thing dysteleologically 
is often associated with immorality (though we dispute that claim below as well).  
The complementarity argument seems related to the teleological argument (which itself is, as 
we have said, often part of a religious viewpoint) but is a little different. It is based on the perception of 
a ‘fit’ of some sort between the male and female bodies that is absent in male-male and female-female 
combinations. Somehow, only man-woman sexual activity is complementary; same sex coupling is not. 
As Akpan says, if we “take a very objective and deep look at the human structure, physique, and 
physiology,” we will see how heterosexual sex is complementary, while homosexual sex is not” (Akpan, 
2017, p.5).  
But what is it exactly that becomes “clear” with this “objective and deep look?” Is it that a penis 
‘fits’ in a vagina in a way that a penis does not fit in an anus or mouth, or other parts of the human body? 
Or that there is no penetration in lesbian sex at all (qua their genitalia)? But what does this mean exactly? 
In one sense, for example, penises do fit into anuses (and other parts of human anatomy) just as they fit 
into vaginas, as evidenced by the fact that all sorts of people – both gay and straight – engage in such 
sexual interaction. So, it can not be just the possibility of penetration that is at issue here. What else, 
then, could it be? Several people who employ this complementarity argument suggest that it is 
reproduction. Hence, though a penis might fit into both an anus and a vagina, it is only through penis-
vaginal intercourse that reproduction is possible (leaving aside for the moment, artificial forms of 
insemination). As we have noted above, however, Akpan himself rejects the teleological/natural 
argument against homosexuality. So, again, we are left to wonder what point(s) Akpan is making here. 
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The passage below is Akpan’s longest explanation of the complementarity argument regarding same 
sex sexual interaction.  
Same-sex marriage is simply bestial: it is a slap on human sensibility and sickly.  If a male 
goat, or dog or any other animal for that matter does not mate with their kind, why should 
man stoop that low to even think of marrying another man?  If man is part of nature, and a 
natural and biological being for that matter, he should know that nature as it had structured 
the physique of man and woman in a way that every part has its function and should be used 
for that function. Or do we use our legs to fly, or our hands to walk or our ears to swallow 
food? Assuming we use any part of our body for non-specific function, we should know that 
such is tangential, and not natural. Assuming we see a man develop wings and fly or a man 
with full fleshed and milk-filled breast for example, would we not say such are unnatural 
phenomena?  Physiologists and medical doctors would claim that such phenomena are 
sickly and abnormal, and not natural: for it is not in the nature of man to fly nor develop full 
fleshed and milk-filled breast.  As such they would look for ways to rectify the abnormality. 
In this sense, does it not occur to homosexuals and supporters that such activity where a 
male sleeps with another male as with a woman is sickening, abnormal and therefore 
obscene, indecent, and immoral (Akpan, pp. 7-8)?  
Akpan seems to make three (related) points here.    
1. Other animal species do not engage is homosexual sex. A male goat or dog does not “mate” 
with another male goat or dog.  
2. Humans are a biological part of nature and indeed survive only through sexual reproduction. 
Nature has structured their bodies – differently for males and females – for exactly this 
reproductive purpose.  
3. It is unnatural for a human to fly or a man to have milk filled breasts. If a human were to try to 
fly or a man to breast feed his baby, this would be abnormal or uncommon, and “therefore 
obscene, indecent, and immoral.”  
Let’s consider these points individually. The first point is quite simply false. Same-sex coupling occurs 
in a great many and wide variety of species, as does ‘incest’, ‘rape’, ‘courtship’, ‘same-sex animal pairs’, 
and so on (Ruse, 1995). Hence, same-sex sexual activity is a widespread ‘natural’ phenomenon. This 
isn’t to say that we think this is particularly meaningful because we believe that human sexuality is 
quite different in significant ways than non-human animal sexuality, and hence the later ought not to 
be taken as a model for the former. We mention the wide spread of same-sex coupling throughout 
the animal kingdom only as it pertains to this unnaturalness and complementarity argument against 
homosexuality.  
The second point is partially true, but in a way that has no or only limited relevance to Akpan’s 
conclusions. Humans are indeed biological beings, and they reproduce sexually, not asexually as some 
species do. Moreover, Akpan is correct that gays and lesbians cannot reproduce, at least qua gay and 
lesbian sex. So, clearly at least some humans must reproduce through sexual reproduction involving 
opposite sex intercourse. But given that heterosexuals constitute most people, there is surely no 
danger in humans becoming extinct because 2-5% of the population are not heterosexual. One could 
add as well that it is surely not immoral for individuals, gay or straight, not to reproduce. Indeed, some 
might argue that with a world population of almost 8 billion, and growing exponentially, it would be 
a benefit to humanity that some people do not reproduce.3 
                                                          
3 This is a sort of modern day rendition of the argument made by some sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists to 
explain the persistence of homosexuality across thousands of generations given that they do not reproduce. Though we do not 
necessarily endorse or agree with sociobiology and its materialistic reductionism, one of their arguments here is that there 
must be some sort of evolutionary advantage to communities having some homosexuals vs. communities that are completely 
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The third point is more complicated since it involves the controversial notion of a teleological, 
God created universe. We have already addressed parts of this argument above by pointing out that 
such a view is anathema to contemporary science, and that “function” is different than “telos.” So, 
organs have functions. And clearly the (or a) function of the male and female reproductive organs is 
reproduction. Even granting this, Akpan’s claims about homosexuality and same-sex marriage still do 
not hold. First, some organs, like the penis, have at least two functions – urination and sexual 
intercourse. Does one take precedence over the other, making one of its uses immoral? If they are 
both legitimate functions of this organ, then why can’t organs in general and this one have more than 
one or two functions? Perhaps intercourse, or sexual activity more generally, functions as a way in 
which to express care and love, or as a way in which to have, under certain conditions, harmless, 
though often deeply meaningful, consensual pleasure?   
Consider in this context, the ‘function’ or ‘telos’ of the female clitoris. Clearly, it functions as a 
way in which women can achieve an orgasm. Indeed, according to some recent research, only 18% of 
women say they can achieve an orgasm by penetrative sex alone (Herbinick et al., 2018). That is, most 
women need direct clitoral stimulation to achieve an orgasm which often does not happen through 
penis-vagina intercourse alone. Is that, then, the function of the clitoris? This possibility becomes even 
more intriguing given that several researchers, perhaps Elisabeth Lloyd (2006) most prominently, 
have argued that the clitoris has no biological, reproductive function!  That is, whether a female 
experiences an orgasm has no impact and hence no purely biological function for human 
reproduction. Is women’s sexual pleasure, then, the function of this organ? Is it immoral not to employ 
the clitoris, for example, through digital or oral stimulation, so this organ can fulfill its function?   
Finally, why does Akpan think that a dysteleological use of an organ makes such a use immoral 
– indeed “sickening” according to Akpan? I use my nose and my ears to hold up my glasses? Is this 
immoral since I am using the organs dysteleologically?  One might note here that such uses of my 
nose and ears are incidental only. But this response is inadequate. Even if we agree that non-
reproductive sex, whether straight or gay, is an incidental use of our sexual organs, we can still ask 
why such incidental use, in and of itself, makes such use immoral.  
Having dealt with the issue about the morality of homosexuality, let’s turn specifically to the matter 
of same-sex marriage. On this subject, Akpan considers, but ultimately rejects, arguments based on 
tradition. He phrases this argument as follows: [T]raditionally, marriage is a sacred union that unites 
man and woman together for life, and any union having to do with sexual relations, but which is 
contrary to the sacred institution is immoral; and would change a generally acceptable tradition” 
(Akpan, 2017, p. 6). Supporters of same-sex marriage respond to this argument from tradition by 
claiming, as Akpan notes, that tradition does not justify an action (Akpan, 2017, p. 6). Most 
states/cultures have at some time condoned slavery. But that does not make such a practice morally 
acceptable no matter how long that practice has been part of that state or culture’s tradition.  
Finally, Akpan considers rights-based arguments that defend the moral legitimacy of 
(homosexuality and) same-sex marriage. Oddly, in our view, Akpan at this point gets into a technical 
issue regarding whether the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)and the 
Human Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) include same-sex marriage rights under their ‘right to 
marry’ articles. We are uncertain why Akpan refers at this point to these documents instead of to 
general claims made by same-sex marriage supporters of human rights in general. Perhaps putting 
forth interpretive questions on these human rights documents somehow weakens the force of these 
                                                          
heterosexual. Some suggestions have been that a slightly smaller community population runs less risk of running out of food. 
Or that having childless gays and lesbians in a community helps with raising the children of heterosexuals. (See, e.g., Ruse, 
1995).  
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documents as they apply to nations such as Nigeria. But Nigeria is a signatory on the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (See UN, 1996).  
As we have discussed in Section 1, human rights have a long history. While the ‘West’ has perhaps 
been at the forefront of promoting and extending human rights over the past two centuries especially, a 
concern for and recognition of human rights has become an increasingly global phenomenon, including 
Africa. Indeed, as we have noted, the recognition of some human rights in Africa has proven to be a 
successful tool in decolonizing Africa. In the next section, we turn to a consideration of how South Africa 
has employed legal rights for sexual minorities to improve both the lives of the LGBTQ+ community and 
improved public health for everyone. Before turning to that material, however, it is important to note 
that people in the ‘West’ are not all pro- LGBTQ+ rights and in favour of same-sex marriage (See, e.g., 
Gallagher’s arguments in Corvino and Gallagher, 2012; Shrage and Stewart, 2015). It is a mistake, then, 
for Akpan to treat the ‘West’ as a single homogeneous viewpoint. Indeed, liberal democracies are 
favoured for the very reason that they offer the hope of peaceful differences of opinion and toleration 
about important issues. Furthermore, not all ‘Western’ arguments supporting LGBTQ+ concerns and 
same-sex marriage are rights based. Many are consequentialist. That is, the arguments employed point 
to the positive consequences respecting the concerns of people not only in the LGBTQ+ community but 
also society at large. Consider, in this context, the following argument by John Corvino in support of what 
he calls “marriage equality:” 
It is good for human beings to commit to someone else to have and to hold, for better or 
worse, and so on, for life. It is good regardless of whether you happen to be straight or gay. It 
is good, not only for them, but also for their neighbors, because happy, stable couples make 
happy, stable citizens. And marriage helps sustain this like nothing else. (Corvino and 
Gallagher, 2012, p. 180). 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF SEXUAL MINORITY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
With regards to constitutional, legislative, or public policy formalizations, states could reasonably 
consider grounding these in human rights principles that govern the collective, regardless of what 
individuals might choose at any given moment for themselves within that collective. In its 
constitutional era, South Africa has turned towards this approach concerning same-sex sexual 
practice or marriage and family, specifically, and broader legislative or policy reform, generally. 
Although not stated as such, this approach implies a distinction between what Habermas (1993) 
termed ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ reasoning – a distinction which Akpan (2017) does not accommodate in 
his arguments. On one hand, the matter of an individual’s (or group’s) life choices, is a question for 
personal (or group) ethical deliberation. What is good for “me” or “us” rests on the same internal logic. 
On the other hand, whether sexual practice or marriage, in general, can be followed as a maxim, is a 
moral question which connects to a principle of universalizability, that is, is it a right that should be 
open to all in relevantly similar circumstances, whether they choose it or not? The latter directly 
affects the collective. With this important distinction, sexual practice and/or marriage is equally open 
to consenting adults who choose such undertakings for themselves and their consenting partners. No 
one is compelled to do so. The individual/pair/group formations of these interactions, be they 
heterosexual or LGBTQ+ or otherwise, should be insignificant. Consequently, for all consenting or 
concerned parties, whether they may find themselves in states in the West or Africa or anywhere else, 
if marriage and sexual rights are recognized as a general good as Corvino (2012) suggests above, then 
these rights should ideally be accessible to all and equally applied. 
South Africa’s pre-constitutional state was rooted in a narrow, religious, conservative morality 
that was oppressive towards sexual minorities with legislation being somewhat disconnected from the 
reality of the social collective. Linking to this problem, Rubin explains that there exists an ordering of 
sexuality and sexual practice in culture that authorizes “good, natural, normal sex” as “heterosexual, 
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marital, monogamous, reproductive, and non-commercial” (Rubin, 1984, p. 152). Rubin exposes a rather 
palpable, yet constructed, connection between heteronormativity and morality in social interaction. 
However, not only is this connection constructed, but it comes with numerous value attachments. Value 
framings, along with simple regularity of occurrence and visibility, has allowed heteronormative 
attitudes to shape socially acceptable sexual practice by portraying heterosexuality as ‘natural’ or 
‘normal’ and these loaded concepts, in turn, further constrain and reproduce social phenomena within a 
feedback loop. Nevertheless, what is common or repeated, may not necessarily be ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ 
and none of these concepts necessarily implies notions of normativity or what should be. Logically 
speaking, these entailments might be arbitrary but the unquestioned leaps between natural-normal-
normative concepts quickly consolidate to form the basis of moral judgments which often fix the basis 
for legislation and other formalizations.  
The sex or sexuality continuum is vast and varied (Fausto-Sterling 2000). Therefore, the norms 
that govern human sexual or marriage interaction would have to be broader and more nuanced. As 
Gagnon rightly asserts, “there are many ways to become, to be, to act, to feel sexual” (Gagnon 1977, 
Preface). To serve an end of justice, as states are obligated to do, formalizations must be able to 
accommodate variations on the sexuality continuum. Accordingly, in the South African Constitution 
(1996), marriage and sexual rights would be granted regardless of personal biographical configurations 
which are specifically listed as: “race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, 
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth” 
(Equality Clause, South African Constitution, 1996). The establishment of the Constitution paved the way 
for the removal of criminalization legislation aimed at LGBTQ+ individuals or communities and allowed 
for full legal recognition of same sex marriage (and adoption) in 2006.  
Human rights resolutions and frameworks, in their current form, were preceded by enormous 
costs in terms of widespread pain, marginalization and loss of human life during global conflict which 
was not limited to populations of the “West.” With a precursory acknowledgement of world history, 
it would be inaccurate to characterize human rights as a “fad” as Akpan does (Akpan, 2017, p. 1). 
Human rights are hard-fought-for highly contested victories. Similarly, in the South African context, 
specifically, the country emerged from long, arduous struggles against forms of tribal conflict, 
colonization, and segregation (apartheid), to become a free, equal, democratic society. During South 
Africa’s well-documented, pre-constitutional era, both as groups and individually, LGBTQ+ 
individuals were habitually categorized as criminals and often bore the brunt of state-sanctioned 
punishment, harassment, force, and violence. LGBTQ+ individuals were routinely rebuffed in society, 
being variously characterized as sinners, or pariahs, as well as pathologized as sexual deviants or 
perverts. Just like other countries, neither disenfranchisement nor sociocultural attacks erased 
LGBTQ+ individuals from South African society but it did marginalize them or drive them 
underground. Furthermore, because apartheid was an explicitly racist system, and deeply connected 
to a particularly conservative brand of Christianity, these exclusions and marginalization were 
“experienced more intensely by those South Africans already suffering under the yoke of apartheid 
because of their race, sex and economic status.” (de Ru, 2013). To be sure, not all sexual liberation 
activism was inclusive of all races (Frühstück 2014, p. 44). 
The first election with universal suffrage took place in 1994. Following the establishment of a 
human rights-based Constitution in 1996, “South Africa thus became the first country in the world 
explicitly to recognise in its Constitution that discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation would 
automatically be unfair until proven otherwise” (de Ru 2013). However, the South African Constitution 
does not only prohibit discrimination, but it also “places a duty on the state to ‘respect, protect, 
promote, and fulfill’ the rights contained in the Bill of Rights” (Bilchitz 2015, p. 24). The expectation 
that active measures be taken by the state with regards to social intervention and promotion of 
equality, is a lesser known and less explored feature of human rights law. With the state taking up that 
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mandate, research, recording, programming, and advocacy endeavours can now be supported. Public 
policy and associated public health policy has expanded significantly to include LGBTQ+ health and 
wellbeing. However, more work needs to be done.   
Currently, South Africa is the only country in Africa to fully recognize same-sex marriage. 
Regarding sexual practice, the rest of the continent’s positions range from states that do not enforce a 
penalty for same-sex sexual practice (like Burkina Faso), to those which may invoke the death penalty 
(like Somalia). That said, social and cultural interaction is typically slow to align itself with legislation. 
Many LGBTQ+ South Africans continue to fight for freedom and acceptance in daily life. South Africa has 
one of the worst records of gender-based violence, globally, which can be argued to be “rooted in unequal 
power in gender relations, patriarchy, homophobia, sexism, amongst other harmful discriminatory 
beliefs and practices” (South African Human Rights Commission, 2018, p. 4). Consequently, LGBTQ+ 
individuals remain some of the most vulnerable members of the population, suffering significant 
minority stress with high incidents of self-harm and harm by others, including brutal hate crimes such as 
“corrective rape” committed by men against lesbians (Frühstück 2014, p. 48).   
In any society, the suppression of sexual rights has grave implications for public safety and, 
consequently, public health. A healthy society implies a safe society. A significant benefit of recognizing 
LGBTQ+ sexual practice and marriage or family, in terms of legislation and constitutional protection, is 
that public health and supporting systems may take necessary measures to implement the appropriate 
research, education, response, treatment and intervention openly and without stigma or castigation for 
themselves and their patients. Decriminalization is not enough. More broadly, formal recognition paves 
the way for a generalized approach of attentiveness, understanding, compassion and support results in 
vastly improved public health interventions for many LGBTQ+ individuals, especially trans individuals 
who have suffered significant rights violations in this sector (Gruskin et al., 2018). Furthermore, when 
LGBTQ+ rights are fully recognized and accepted by the state, research, recording, programming, and 
advocacy endeavours may be supported. These, in turn, can provide valuable, reliable, and publicly 
accessible information. Access to information is vital for the implementation, monitoring, and protection 
of human rights (South African Human Rights Commission 2018, pp. 16-17). Without impediment from 
either legislation or social custom, the state’s initiatives to create and expand statistical databases can 
be developed and utilized to screen and scrutinize all forms of discrimination and harm experienced by 
LGBTQ+ individuals. This is essential to establishing strategies or policies for all public sectors that are 
beneficial to all societal members regardless of individual gender or sexual identity.    
South Africa, like many countries around the globe, has emerged from discriminatory pasts 
and chosen formal approaches to rights. Patriarchal regulation of female sexuality as well as what 
counts as legitimate sex is well documented (Stearns 2009, p. 17). The characterization of sexual rights 
and freedoms as a Western intrusion or colonial interference is also well documented. (Stearns, 2009, 
pp. 157, 158). South Africa continues to strive for equality and social reform under the same yokes. 
However, progression towards realizing rights for all continues in the modern era because of 
developments in global rights and standards that serve to minimize harm, especially with respect to 
violence against women and sexual minorities and its repercussions for physical and mental health. 
In closing, we would like to remind readers of a lesson that was, or at least should have been, 
learned during the initial stages of the HIV/AIDS crisis. In the West, HIV/AIDS was initially thought to be 
a disease caused by and contained within the male gay community. Hence, the first ‘formal’ name for 
this disease was “gay-related immune deficiency,” or GRID, but was referred to informally as ‘the gay 
plague’ (Wikipedia, ND). Because of its association with gay men and gay sex, followers of the “just world 
hypothesis/fallacy,” HIV/AIDS was thought to be the just retribution for people engaging in immoral 
sexual activity (Lerner and Montada, 1998). Hence, the evangelical minister and founder of the Moral 
Majority, Jerry Falwell, infamously said in 1983 that “AIDS is not just God's punishment for homosexuals; 
it is God's punishment for the society that tolerates homosexuals." (Cohen, ND). Moreover, in 1981, 
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Ronald Reagan had just become President of the US in large measure from the support he received from 
American evangelicals like Falwell, and so he was reticent to devote time or research money to the 
disease. Reagan would address HIV/AIDS much later in his presidency at the Third International 
Conference on AIDS in Washington. When he spoke, 36,058 Americans had been diagnosed with AIDS 
and 20,849 had died. The disease had spread to 113 countries, with more than 50,000 cases” (White, 
2004). The lesson here, surely, is that public health and safety ought not to become a political issue where 
some groups of people are cast aside as unworthy of care. As we have pointed out, by recognizing legal 
rights for those in the LGBTQ+ community, South Africa has made all its citizens safer and healthier. It is 
time for more African nations to follow their lead.  
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